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FOURTH CIRCUIT RE VIEW
XI. PROPERTY
Comparative Hardship Doctrine Applied in Easement Action
The doctrine of comparative hardship is applied in equity when a
landowner seeks an injunction to remove an encroachment upon a pro-
perty right by an adjoining landowner.1 To apply the doctrine, an equity
court must first find that the encroachment was by "innocent mistake"2
and that the encroachment results in only "slight interference."3 If the
encroachment is both innocent and slight, the court will then balance the
benefit of an injunction to the plaintiff against the inconvenience and
damage which the injunction would cause to the defendant.4 Although
the plaintiffs rights have been violated, the court may decline to order
the removal of the encroachment if the costs to the defendant outweigh
the benefits to the plaintiff.' The plaintiff then could seek only the
remedy of monetary damages at law.' In Griffin v. Red Run Lodge, Inc.,7
1 Maryland's doctrine of comparative hardship is generally known in other jurisdic-
tions as "relative hardship." Compare Dundalk Holding Co. v. Easter, 215 Md. 549, _, 137
A.2d 667, 670 cert denied, 358 U.S. 821 (1958) with RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 563 (1944).
See note 8 infra.
Equity jurisdiction arises when the aggrieved party has no adequate remedy at law
and relief is available in equity. See 27 AM. JUR. 2d Equity § 5 (1969). An injunction is an
equitable remedy whose purpose is to preserve the status quo or restore the conditions
which existed prior to the encroachment by control of the defendant's acts. See 42 AM. Jun.
2D Injunctions §2 (1969). When a property right has been encroached upon, the owner may
seek injunctive relief to restore the full rights of the owner. See Dundalk Holding Co. v.
Easter, 215 Md. 549, -, 137 A.2d 667, 670 (1958); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 528, com-
ment e (1944).
2 See Dundalk Holding Co. v. Easter, 215 Md. 549, -, 137 A.2d 667, 670 (1958)
(defendant's good faith reliance on measurements of reputable surveyor held to be innocent
mistake); Peters v. Archambault, 361 Mass. 91, __, 278 N.E.2d 729, 731 (1972). Although
Maryland requires an innocent mistake by the defendant, other states require that the in-
trusion be "not willful" for the doctrine of comparative hardship to apply. See Hasselbring
v. Koepke, 263 Mich. 466, -, 248 N.W. 869, 872 (1933) (obstruction cannot be "malicious");
Moyerman v. Glanzberg, 391 Pa. 387, 391, 138 A.2d 681, 685 (1958) (encroachment cannot be
made "deliberately and wilfully"); Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First Nat'l Bldg. Co., 89 Utah
456, -, 57 P.2d 1099, 1126 (1936) (intrusion cannot be "willful or hostile"). The terms "in-
nocent" and "not willful" have different connotations and different effects on the burden of
proof. See text accompanying notes 23-28 infra.
' See Easter v. Dundalk Holding Co., 199 Md. 303, 305, 86 A.2d 404, 405 (1952)
(building which encroached on property by one foot held slight interference); Peters v. Ar-
chambault, 361 Mass. 91,_ , 278 N.E.2d 729, 731 (1972) (house which encroached upon nine
percent of plaintiffs lot was not slight interference).
' See Dundalk Holding Co. v. Easter, 215 Md. 549, -, 137 A.2d 667, 671 (1958). In
Dundalk Holding Co. the Maryland Court of Appeals found that the defendant's encroach-
ment by one foot onto the plaintiff's land was both an innocent mistake and slight in-
terference. Id. The court denied injunctive relief because the $100,000 cost of moving the
defendant's building outweighed the plaintiffs potential benefit of $100, the value of one
foot of frontal property. Id. at -, 137 A.2d at 669.
Id. at -_ 137 A.2d at 671.
I Id. at., 137 A.2d at 670.
7 610 F.2d 1198 (4th Cir. 1979).
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the Fourth Circuit considered the proper allocation of the burden of
proof to establish innocent mistake in the blocking of an easement of in-
gress and egress under Maryland law.8 The Fourth Circuit held that in
order for Maryland's equitable doctrine of comparative hardship to bar
injunctive relief, the defendant must prove his innocent mistake.' The
Fourth Circuit also reviewed the federal jurisdictional amount require-
ment and held that the plaintiffs good faith claim, although disproved at
trial, satisifed the jurisdictional amount in a diversity action."0
The Griffins purchased their vacation home in 1965.11 The deed was
properly recorded and specifically included an easement of ingress and
egress over an existing road. 2 The Griffins and their neighbors used the
road continuously. 3 In 1972, Red Run purchased the land over which the
easement ran in order to build a recreation area. As part of its develop-
ment plan, Red Run destroyed the road and constructed tennis courts on
the right of way. Red Run provided alternate roads to serve the traffic
that had used the original right of way." The Griffins claimed that they
were never consulted by the defendant prior to the destruction of the
road, nor did they agree to a relocation of their existing easement.'5
' Griffin was a diversity action. Id. at 1199. In a diversity action, a federal court
must apply the substantive law of the forum state. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
73 (1938). Since the Griffin's property was located in Maryland, the Fourth Circuit applied
Maryland law. 610 F.2d at 1200. Like the doctrine of relative hardship used by other states,
Maryland's comparative hardship doctrine involves a cost-benefit balancing of an injunction
if the court finds an encroachment to be both an innocent mistake and a slight interference.
See Amabile v. Winkles, 276 Md. 234, 241, 347 A.2d 212, 217 (1975); Columbia Hills Corp. v.
Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 231 Md. 379, -, 190 A.2d 635, 638 (1963); Hanley v.
Stulman, 216 Md. 461, __, 141 A.2d 167, 172 (1958; Dundalk Holding Co. v. Easter, 215
Md. 549, - , 137 A.2d 667, 670 (1958); Lichtenberg v. Sachs, 213 Md. 147, - , 131 A.2d
264, 266 (1957); Easter v. Dundalk Holding Co., 199 Md. 303, -, 86 A.2d 404, 405 (1952).
610 F.2d at 1202.
,0 Id at 1204-05. In order to establish jurisdiction in a diversity action, federal law pro-
vides that the amount in controversy must exceed $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976).
" 610 F.2d at 1200. Originally, the plaintiff-appellant Mary Griffin was joined by her
husband in bringing the action for injunctive relief and damages. After the death of her hus-
band, Griffin filed a suggestion of death. Since Griffin was executrix of her husband's
estate, the trial court substituted her as party plaintiff. Brief for Appellee at 2, Griffin v.
Red Run Lodge, Inc., 610 F.2d 1198 (4th Cir. 1979). Plaintiff brought the suit individually
and as executrix of her husband's estate. 610 F.2d at 1199.
" 610 F.2d at 1200. The right-of-way provisions of the deed provide:
[AIll rights of the parties of the first part to use in perpetuity as a means of outlet
from and as an access to said lots, the existing roads leading therefrom in a North-
westerly and Southwesterly direction to the roads [sic] intersection with the
County Road that leads to U.S. Route 219 and the Deep Creek Dam.
Brief for Appellant at 2, Griffin v. Red Run Lodge, Inc., 610 F.2d 1198 (4th Cir. 1979).
" 610 F.2d at 1200.
14 I&
SId. The plaintiffs used their property as a vacation home. The Griffins first learned
of the destruction of their right of way when they went on vacation and found the defen-
dant's tennis courts instead of the road. Brief for Appellant at 3.
[Vol. XXXVIII
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At trial, Red Run did not dispute that it had infringed upon the
rights of the plaintiff." Asserting that the plaintiff could not prove the
Red Run's act constituted a willful interference with the plaintiff's
rights, Red Run relied on the doctrine of comparative hardship to oppose
the granting of an injunction. 17 Red Run claimed that its acts were not
willful because it had relied on an attorney's advice obtained prior to the
destruction of the easement.18 The defendant further claimed that actual
damages to the residents were minimal since the development project
actually benefitted the neighborhood by replacing an unsightly road
with alternate roads and a recreation area.19 Finding that the plaintiff
had not shown intentional and willful invasion by Red Run of the plain-
tiffs right of way, the district court denied equitable relief." The district
court also granted Red Run's motion to dismiss because actual damages
proved did not amount to a sum in excess of $10,000 to satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement21 and plaintiff had not established a basis for
punitive damages.'
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court and held that
the district judge had incorrectly required the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant's violation of the easement was willful.' Under Maryland's
doctrine of comparative hardship, the Fourth Circuit determined that
the burden lies on the defendant to prove that its actions resulted from
an innocent mistake.24 The court further held that proof of innocent
mistake is not the same as proof of nonwillfulness. The Griffin court
recognized that innocent mistake is a higher standard of proof than non-
willfulness.8 In order to prove innocent mistake, Red Run must prove
that it either had no notice of the Griffins' rights, or if it had notice, made a
good faith error which resulted in only a slight interference with the plain-
tiff's rights.' Since the district court required the incorrect party to prove
the incorrect standard, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the
case.2
16 610 F.2d at 1200.
' Id.
18 Id
19 Id Plaintiff and local residents allege that the new road provided by the defendant
was narrow, impassable in winter snow, and longer than the original right of way. Brief for
Appellant at 10-11.
' 610 F.2d at 1200.
21 Id.; see text accompanying notes 47-55 infra.
610 F.2d at 1200.
23 Id.
2, Id. at 1202.
Id. The Fourth Circuit found that "nonwillfulness" and "innocence" do not have
precisely the same connotation. Nonwillfulness is a negative term which places the burden
of proof on the easement holder as required by the district court. The Fourth Circuit decid-
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Maryland law requires that for the doctrine of comparative hardship
to apply, the encroachment must be the result of an innocent mistake.'
Without a showing by the defendant of his good faith reliance on incor-
rect advice, 0 an encroachment is not an innocent mistake where the
defendant had actual3l or constructive" notice of the easement. On re-
mand, Red Run will have difficulty proving that an innocent mistake oc-
curred. The defendant had actual notice of the plaintiffs easement
because of the obvious use of the road by the plaintiff and her
neighbors.' Since the deed was recorded, the defendant also had con-
structive notice under Maryland law.3 A finding of constructive or
actual notice directly relates to the success of the defendant's argument
that the encroachment was an innocent mistake due to reliance upon its
attorney's advice. The Fourth Circuit stated that Red Run must prove
that all relevant facts were fully disclosed to the attorney."' At trial,
See note 8 supra.
See Dundalk Holding Co. v. Easter, 215 Md. 549, __, 137 A.2d 667, 671 (1958). In
Dundalk, the Maryland Court of Appeals found that the defendant had made an innocent
mistake because the defendant relied in good faith upon the measurements of a reputable
surveyor which were later proved to be incorrect. Id.
31 See Columbia Hills Corp. v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 231 Md. 379,
190 A.2d 635, 637 (1963); Hanley v. Stulman, 216 Md. 461, __, 141 A.2d 167, 171 (1958);
Lichtenberg v. Sachs, 213 Md. 147, -, 131 A.2d 264, 266 (1957). In Columbia Hills, the
defendant blocked the entrance to the plaintiffs driveway with a curb and a stone monu-
ment. 231 Md. at __, 190 A.2d at 637. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that even.
though the plaintiffs deed containing the easement provision was unrecorded, the obvious
physical circumstances gave the defendant actual notice. Id. Since the defendant had actual
notice, there was no innocent mistake, and the court could not apply the doctrine of com-
parative hardship. Id. In Hanley, the president of the defendant corporation was advised in
writing of the existence of the easement, a road. 216 Md. at -, 141 A.2d at 171. The presi-
dent stated that he would take his chances and obliterated the road. Id. The Court of Ap-
peals found no innocent mistake, and therefore, no application of comparative hardship. Id.
In Lichtenberg v. Sachs, the defendant ignored a prior injunction ordering him not to block
the easement, a road. 213 Md. at __, 131 A.2d at 266. Since the injunction gave actual
notice to the defendant of the plaintiffs easement, the Court of Appeals found no innocent
mistake by the defendant when he built a house directly on the road. Id.
I See Amabile v. Winkles, 276 Md. 234, 241, 347 A.2d 212, 215 (1975. In Amabile, the
plaintiffs right of way was recorded by deed, but the exact physical path of the easement
was unclear. Id, Plaintiff had graded and improved what he thought was the easement when
the defendant began constructing an apartment building on the same area. Id. The Court of
Appeals held that the terms of the easement in the recorded deed should have put the
defendant on notice of the easement and at least prompted the defendant to investigate
before continuing construction. Id.
See 610 F.2d at 1204.
See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 3-101 (1974). Constructive notice of deed provisions
exists even if the easement is not disclosed in the deed. Id. The deed to the Griffins included
express provisions for the easement and was duly recorded. 610 F.2d at 1200.
1 610 F.2d at 1203. See United States v. McLennan, 563 F.2d 943, 946 (9th Cir. 1977).
In order for advice of counsel to be a defense, the defendant must apprise his attorney of all
the facts, and counsel must specifically advise the course of conduct taken by the defendant
Id.
[Vol. XXXVII
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however, Red Run offered no proof of full disclosure to its attorney. 8 If
the defendant did not mention its awareness of the easement to the at-
torney, the defendant cannot rely upon the attorney's advice to indicate
that the encroachment was an innocent mistake.'
If the defendant succeeds in proving that the encroachment was an
innocent mistake, the defendant must then prove that the interference
with the easement holder is slight and leaves the enjoyment of the ease-
ment essentially unimpaired. 8 The Fourth Circuit held that the substitu-
tion of a new road which is as good or better than the easement does not
satisfy the slight interference requirement since the tennis courts com-
pletely destroyed the easement. 9 By destroying the road, Red Run at-
tempted to take the plaintiffs rights in the property."' Maryland courts
have held that equity cannot compel the owner of land to surrender his
property to another person who lacks the power of eminent domain.41 To
compel the surrender would allow an unconstitutional taking of property
by a private person for a private gain.
42
In light of the facts available from the record, the Fourth Circuit's
opinion in Griffin leaves little doubt that the doctrine of comparative
hardship cannot bar an injunctive remedy in this case. Comparative
hardship is a bar available only to a defendant who can first prove that
610 F.2d at 1203-04.
1 Id. at 1203. Red Run simply asked its attorney whether it was legal to build a new
road on the property. Id. Counsel advised the defendant to proceed. Id. The Fourth Circuit
stated that the defendant had the right to construct as many roads on its property as it
wished as long as the construction did not interfere with the plainitffs rights. Id. The court
observed that to approve the construction of one road is not to condone the destruction of
another. Id. The Fourth Circuit found that it was nearly impossible that any attorney would
have condoned the destruction of the road if Red Run had fully informed its counsel. Id. at
1204. The Griffin court refused to permit a lawyer to confer a positive benefit on a client by
giving incorrect advice. Id. at 1204 n.4.
See Dundalk Holding Co. v. Easter, 215 Md. 549, 556, 137 A.2d 667, 671 (1958). The
defendant's building in Dundalk was only one foot over the boundary line. Id. at __, 137
A.2d at 668. The defendant alleged that the encroachment was a slight interference with the
plaintiff's rights and that the plaintiff's property had actually appreciated in value due to
the location of defendant's building. Id. at -, 137 A.2d at 669.
" 610 F.2d at 1203. An easement holder has a property right, however insignificant, to
which he alone is entitled. Id.
"l See Easter v. Dundalk Holding Co., 199 Md. 303, 307, 86 A.2d 404, 406 (1952).
" See Lichtenberg v. Sachs, 213 Md. 147, 152, 131 A.2d 264, 266-67 (1957); Easter v.
Dundalk Holding Co., 199 Md. 303, 307, 86 A.2d 404, 406 (1952).
42 See Columbia Hills Corp. v. Merchantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 231 Md. 379, 382,
190 A.2d 635, 638 (1963). The Maryland Constitution provides that no one shall be deprived
of his property without due process of law. MD. CONST. of 1867, art. 23, Declaration of
Rights. See also U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV. An encroachment upon an easement is a taking
of a property right without due process. See Columbia Hills Corp. v. Mercantile-Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 231 Md. 379, 382, 190 A.2d 635, 638 (1963). Equity cannot justify such
an intentional taking. See Lichtenberg v. Sachs, 213 Md. 147, 152, 131 A.2d 264, 266-67
(1957).
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his encroachment was an innocent mistake and resulted only in a slight
interference.43 As a result of Red Run's actual and constructive notice of
the easement, Red Run will be able to prove that its encroachment was
an innocent mistake only if Red Run proves that it made a full disclosure
to its attorney." Even if the mistake is found to be innocent, the total
destruction of the easement surpasses the slight interference standard
established by case law.45
After reversing the trial court's decision on the issue of injunctive
relief, the Fourth Circuit considered the trial court's dismissal of the suit
as a result of the plaintiff's failure to prove that damages exceeded
$10,000.46 The Fourth Circuit held that the district court had committed
plain and prejudicial error by dismissing the suit.47 The Fourth Circuit
reasoned that the good faith claim of the plaintiff determines the amount
in controversy. 8 The court must determine to a "legal certainty" that
the plaintiff's claim was not made in good faith in order to justify
dismissal.49 A legal certainty, however, need not be absolute. A probabili-
ty at the time of the pleading that the damages will exceed the jurisdic-
tional amount will satisfy the good faith requirement."0 The Fourth Circuit
recognized that a plaintiff may aggregate his claims against an opposing
party to satisfy the requirement for the jurisdictional amount.51 Once
claims have been properly aggregated and original jurisdiction has at-
tached, dismissal of one claim does not remove the other claims from the
court's original diversity jurisdiction.2 The Fourth Circuit found that in
Griffin the amount in controversy could reasonably exceed $10,000.'
,3 See text accompanying notes 1-6 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 29-37 supra.
"S See text accompanying notes 38-42 supra.
4' 610 F.2d at 1204; see note 10 supra.
47 610 F.2d at 1204. An erroneous ruling which relates to the substantial rights of a
party is ground for reversal unless it affirmatively appears from the whole record that the
ruling was not prejudicial. See McCandless v. United States, 298 U.S. 342, 347-48 (1936.
610 F.2d at 1204-05.
" See Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 353 (1961) (amount in controversy
must be determined from complaint itself); St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303
U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938) (sum claimed by plaintiff controls determination of jurisdictional
amount if claim is made in good faith).
I0 See Friedman v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 220 F.2d 808, 810 (D.C. Cir.) cert
denied, 350 U.S. 824 (1955).
't 610 F.2d at 1204-05; see Lynch v. Porter, 446 F.2d 225, 228 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir. 1968). A party may join
in the same action as many claims as he has against an opposing party. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
A plaintiff may aggregate these claims to satisfy the monetary amount for federal jurisdic-
tion. See Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir. 1968); 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1
0.97, at 882-84 (2d ed. 1964).
' 610 F.2d at 1204. See Lynch v. Porter, 446 F.2d 225, 228 (8th Cir. 1971); Stone v.
Stone, 405 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir. 1968).
610 F.2d at 1205. Although the matter of federal jurisdiction is a federal question,
the federal courts must look to state law to determine the nature and extent of the right to
be enforced. See Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 351 (1961); note 8 supra.
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit considered Maryland substantive law to determine the extent
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Due to the extensive expense which Red Run would incur in restoring
the plaintiffs right of way if the plaintiff prevailed,' the court found
that the plaintiff's claim satisfied the jurisdictional amount even without
including the claim for punitive damages.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Griffin v. Red Run Lodge, Inc. is
sound. The district court judge clearly committed reversible error on
the issues of the plaintiffs burden of proof and jurisdictional amount.
Griffin clarifies Maryland case law by emphasizing that a court must
first find an innocent mistake and a slight interference by the defendant
before the equitable doctrine of comparative hardship will apply. By plac-
ing the burden of proof of innocent mistake on the defendant, the Fourth
Circuit has merely placed the burden on the party who is attempting to
bar the equitable remedy. The court's discussion in Griffin of the federal
jurisdiction amount requirement is a straightforward review of establish-
ed federal law. Griffin will make the law of comparative hardship easier
for courts and litigants to understand in an action for injunctive relief
from an encroachment upon an easement.
JEFFREY C. PALKOVITZ
of the remedies available to a plaintiff suing for an encroachment upon his easement. 610
F.2d at 1205-06. In an action for the loss of property rights, the damages which may be
recovered include the cost of restoration of the property right, damages for loss of personal
enjoyment and use, the value of the use of the property during the time necessary to return
the use of the property right, and difference in market value before and after the violation
of the easement. See Superior Constr. Co. v. Elmo, 204 Md. 1, -, 102 A.2d 739, 743-44
(1954).
610 F.2d at 1205-06.
The Fourth Circuit did not consider whether Griffin could recover punitive damages
in a Maryland equity court. Id. In Maryland, equity cannot award punitive damages. See
Prucha v. Weiss, 233 Md. 479, -, 197 A.2d 253, 255-56, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 992 (1964);
Superior Constr. Co. v. Elmo, 204 Md. 1, 14, 104 A.2d 581, 586-87 (1954). The plaintiff would
be unjustly enriched if awarded punitive damages since equity attempts only to return the
parties to their positions before the encroachment. See Funger v. Mayor of Somerset, 244
Md. 141, -, 223 A.2d 168, 173 (1966). A plaintiff may include a prayer for general relief,
however, that would make damages available as a legal remedy. See Superior Constr. Corp.
v. Elmo, 204 Md. 1, -, 104 A.2d 581, 584 (1954). The plaintiff has the further burden of
proving fraud, malice, evil intent, or oppression to be awarded punitive damages. See
Empire Realty Co. v. Fleisher, 269 Md. 278, 288, 305 A.2d 144, 150 (1973). The defendant's
act must be unlawful and of a criminal or wanton nature. Id. at 288, 305 A.2d at 150. See also
Associates Discount Corp. v. Hillary, 262 Md. 570, 582, 278 A.2d 592, 598 (1971) (although
wanton conduct of defendant may be actual malice, plaintiff still must prove evil motive or
intent); GAI Audio of N.Y., Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 27 Md. App. 172,
203-04, 340 A.2d 736, 754-55 (1975) (plaintiff must prove not only wanton and intentional act
but also evil motive influenced by hate). Courts may also allow punitive damages where
there has been gross fraud or a violation of trust or confidence. See Empire Realty Co. v.
Fleisher, 269 Md. 278, 289, 305 A.2d 144, 149-50 (1973). Although Griffin made a general
prayer for relief, 610 F.2d at 1205 n.5(a), the court is not likely to grant punitive damages in
addition to a grant of injunctive relief. On remand, the court may view granting of both
prayers as unjust enrichment. See Funger v. Mayor of Somerset, 244 Md. 141, -, 223
A.2d 168, 173 (1966).
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